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FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND 
U.S. v. IBM. By Franklin M Fisher, John J. McGowan, and Joen E. 
Greenwood. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 1983. Pp. ix, 443. 
$25. 
United States v. IBM will go down in history as one of the larg-
est, longest, and costliest antitrust cases ever filed by the government. 
Thus, most people were surprised when William Baxter, then assis-
tant attorney general in charge of the Antitrust Division, agreed to 
dismiss the case completely some thirteen years after it was filed. 
The dismissal led many to question what went wrong with the suit. 
One wondered how the government could expend so many resources 
and then say that the case was without merit. Had the situation 
changed so completely since the case was filed, or had the govern-
ment made a mistake by bringing the case in the first place? More 
important, what should be done to avoid the recurrence of an I BM-
like behemoth? In Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated, Franklin Fisher, 
John McGowan and Joen Greenwood attempt to answer these ques-
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tions by giving the reader a detailed look at the workings of this 
massive case. 
All three of the authors were heavily involved in the develop-
ment and presentation of IBM's side of the case. Fisher testified as 
an expert witness, and McGowan and Greenwood both assisted 
Fisher and provided economic consulting services for IBM counsel. 
It is from this perspective that the authors present their position: the 
government's case was always without merit and was brought merely 
because the government's economic analysis was unsound (pp. 1-2). 
To prove their thesis, the authors discuss many of the major is-
sues in the case and present evidence that purports to explain why 
IBM did not monopolize the industry. The authors first present a 
general chapter on analyzing competition and monopoly to help 
make the arguments accessible even to non-economists. In this 
chapter, the authors criticize the traditional economic analysis of 
competition as being too simplistic and prone.to error (p. 19). They 
argue that the mistakes produced by relying on a superficial under-
standing of the competitive model stem from focusing on long run 
equilibrium and analyzing the competitive situation in an industry in 
light of expected equilibrium behavior. If an industry is not in long 
run equilibrium - and the authors argue that the computer industry 
was not - then it should not be expected to behave in the same 
manner. Where long run equilibrium is absent, the authors conclude 
that our traditional1 measures of monopoly power are not appropri-
ate tools for analyzing a firm's behavior. 
While this overview is helpful in explaining the types of analyses 
that the authors will use in examining the computer industry, and in 
pointing out the weaknesses of these analyses in some situations, it 
can be misleading, particularly to non-economists. Unlike purely 
academic discussions of these issues,2 this portion of the book is 
designed with the goals of future chapters in mind. Thus, what ap-
pears at first to be a purely abstract discussion of issues is really a 
way to set the stage for later arguments. Though this is not inappro-
priate, the reader should at least be aware that later chapters color 
the author~• discussion of theory and should therefore evaluate the 
book's opening arguments carefully. · 
An example of the possibility of misleading the unwary reader is 
1. The authors discuss traditional analyses such as differentiated versus homogeneous 
products, pp. 20-27, quality competition, pp. 27-30, innovative competition, pp. 33-37, and 
other indicia of competition, pp. 39-41. 
2. For a disinterested analysis, see ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC ANALYSIS). This book is a compilation of essays by leading 
commentators on many of the economic issues addressed in antitrust cases. It is particularly 
useful because it highlights the difficulties of drawing definite conclusions about the issues. 
This is a strong contrast to the one-sided approach of the authors of Folded, Spindled, and 
Mutilated. 
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the authors' discussion of the role of market share data in monopoli-
zation cases. While the authors correctly argue that monopoly 
power is not automatically proved by demonstrating a high market 
share, they seem to imply incorrectly that market share information 
should not be considered at all by the government in bringing an 
antitrust action. Yet, in at least two ways, market share data is very 
important as an indicator of potential monopoly problems and as an 
element of monopolization cases. First, the courts often infer the 
existence of some monopoly power when a firm holds a large share 
of a market.3 While market share is not the only measure of monop-
oly power, it is important in determining whether a potential suit 
exists and as some indication of that power.4 Second, actions that 
are acceptable for firms with little share of a market may not be ac-
ceptable for a firm with a large market share.5 Market share data 
combined with other indicators of market power create a presump-
tion of monopoly power which may be rebutted if the defendant 
proves that his market share was gained through superior skill.6 
From this general chapter, the authors proceed to develop the 
specific economic analyses for the computer industry. They analyze 
the industry as to market definition, market share, innovation, barri-
ers to entry, and profits. Unfortunately, the way in which the au-
thors develop these analyses raises problems of one-sidedness. 
One important example is the definition of the relevant market. 
Defining the relevant market is one of the most difficult tasks in an 
antitrust case.7 Yet the authors' arguments imply that there is only 
one possible measurement for the computer industry and challenge 
the government's market share analysis on the ground that it defines 
the market too narrowly. The authors claim: "When the analysis is 
to determine if monopoly power exists, the fact of [market] con-
straints is the crucial issue for market definitions" (p. 75, emphasis in 
original). That is clearly true and even the government would not 
deny it. The hard question, which the authors do not adequately an-
swer, is what constraints on a firm's actions are the relevant ones. 
The important constraints are those that will constrain a firm before 
3. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.Mass. 
1953), qffd. per curiam, 341 U.S. 521 (1954). 
4. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice Merger Guidelines, June 14, 1982, at 16. Other things 
being equal, concentration affects the likelihood that one firm, or a small group of firms, could 
successfully exercise monopoly power. 
5. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), 
qffd. per curiam, 341 U.S. 521 (1954). 
6. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 497 (1974) (suggesting that 
market shares are prima facie evidence of illegality and that it is up to defendants to show that 
those market shares lack the significance that they would otherwise have). 
7. For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in this procedure, see Boyer, Industry Bound-
aries, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 2; Posner, The Problem of Markel i}ejinilion, in 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 2. 
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it can earn monopoly profits. 8 
The market definition that the authors off er appears to go to the 
opposite extreme of the government's and becomes too broad. In 
analyzing market shares, the authors define the relevant market as 
the entire electronic data processing industry (pp. 110-21). The EDP 
industry, however, includes everything from mainframe manufactur-
ers to payroll processing companies. The authors do not explain why 
these provide more relevant constraints than those selected by the 
government. So once again the authors set out their analyses only in 
the light most favorable to IBM. 
While this one-sidedness is expected because of the authors' per-
sonal role in defending IBM, the book unfortunately degenerates 
into a personal vendetta against the government's actions in the case. 
Not only are the authors strongly critical of the government's posi-
tions in general (pp. 11-12), they also indulge in personal attacks on 
the government's witnesses. The authors argue that the differences 
between the two market definition approaches "did not for the most 
part consist of matters over which reasonable people - let alone 
trained economists - should differ" (p. 121 ). Yet reasonable people, 
and even trained economists, will continue to differ over what is a 
relevant constraint and how to define markets. This animosity to-
ward the opposition repeatedly appears in the way that the book is 
written and argued. It leaves an unpleasant taste and seriously 
harms the authors' credibility. 
Despite the difficulties created by its clearly one-sided approach, 
the book is well worth reading for its exploration of the workings of 
a massive antitrust suit. The book is a rare opportunity to see behind 
the result of a case. Not since Kaysen's postmortem of his work as a 
law clerk to Judge Wysanski in United Shoe9 has the public had the 
chance to see in such vivid detail what issues were critical to such a 
suit and how they were resolved. Readers are able to see the differ-
ent approaches one might take to defining a market, measuring the 
impact of innovation, and measuring whether there are monopoly 
profits. This book differs significantly from Kaysen's work, however, 
as the authors of Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated were intimately in-
volved as representatives of one of the parties. Thus, the reader 
should keep in mind the author's perspective and continually ques-
tion the book's conclusions: does the evidence justify the authors' 
strong anti-government position or is it merely presented in a 
slanted, unobjective manner? 
The biggest contribution that the book makes is one that is not 
the authors' primary objective. The reader is forced to realize that 
8. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 239 (1981). 
9. C. KAYSEN, UNITED ST.ATES Y. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF AN ANTI-TRUST CASE (1956). 
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the outcome of an antitrust case depends on economic analysis, as 
well as how the various parties use the economic tools available to 
them. The central issue in a section 2 case is whether the firm has , 
"monopoly power"10 or has achieved its dominant market position 
solely through "superior skill, foresight and industry."11 There is no 
easy proof of either of these positions and thus complicated eco-
nomic analyses must be undertaken. Of course, opposing parties 
will use the methodologies best suited to their respective positions in 
the case. The judges, who often have little or no economic training, 
must first make subtle judgments about which approach is more ap-
propriate and then about the chosen approach's relevance to the is-
sues at hand. 
Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated does not convince the reader that 
IBM was an exemplary competitor or that the suit should never have 
been brought. Though the authors take Baxter's statement that the 
case was "without merit" to mean that the case should never have 
been filed (p. 369), a complete view of the case indicates that their 
conclusion is not clearly warranted. In Baxter's memorandum to the 
Attorney General, he admits: "It may well be that IBM is a monop-
olist and controls some segment of the computer market." 12 But 
when one considered that the party most likely to have been harmed 
by IBM's actions had already received a settlement of over $100 mil-
lion in its own suit against IBM and that it was unclear that an ap-
propriate remedy could be formulated, the continuation of the suit 
appeared imprudent. This does not mean, however, that the suit was 
"without merit" at the time it was begun. Further, w1iat appears so 
clear to the authors today could not have been so clear to any of the 
parties when the suit was filed in 1969. In fact, much of the informa-
tion on which the authors base their judgments was not available at 
that time. The computer industry has changed significantly in the 
intervening years and in fact may have changed because of the suit. 
Despite the one-sidedness of the authors' analysis and conclu-
sions, Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated is important reading for any-
one who may someday be involved in antitrust suits. The IBM case 
highlights the pitfalls of proving or defending against a Sherman Act 
claim. Thus, even if the reader is not convinced that IBM was right, 
he or she is at least much more aware of the problems inherent in 
such a case. Perhaps that awareness will prevent another IBM. 
10. Monopoly Power is defined as the power to "control prices or exclude competitors." 
Exercise of such power is a violation of§ 2 of the Sherman Act. United States v. E.I. Dupont, 
351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956). 
11. Ifa company attains a dominant position merely because it competed fairly and did a 
better job than its competitors, it is not guilty of monopolization under the Sherman Act. 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (1945). 
12. The memorandum is reprinted in full in Sullivan, Monopolization: Corporate Strategy, 
the IBM Cares:, af!d the Transformation of the Law, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 587, 639-43 (1982). 
